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Theory and Evidence on the Liability of Relationship Commitment: Towards an Understanding of 
Why Vendor Firms Persist in Underperforming Customer Relationships 
 
 
Abstract 
 
In this multi-method study, we extend and complement extant research on relationship commitment 
through rigorous field research and an in-depth cross-functional review to develop a model of the antecedents 
of vendor firms’ commitment to underperforming customer relationships.  The conceptual model 
incorporates relationship-, performance-, organizational-, and investment-related factors as antecedents to 
vendor commitment.  We then test the model with two survey-based studies, and compare and contrast the 
impact of these various antecedents across 382 underperforming and above-average performance customer 
relationships. The results indicate that continuity of relationship personnel, relationship age, performance 
stability, nature of performance change, visibility of the relationship, senior management involvement, 
orientation towards customer retention and risk, co-development, efficaciousness of the investment and 
resource commitment explain vendor firms’ commitment to under-performing relationships.  In contrast, 
customer reputation, asset specificity along with relationship age, customer retention orientation and resource 
commitment are related to vendor firms’ commitment to above-average performance customer relationships.  
Further, using a conjoint type approach, we identify and rank-order (in terms of effectiveness) a set of 
remedial actions that vendor firms take to turnaround an underperforming customer relationship. 
Specifically, reframing the joint goals of the relationship, reevaluating internal processes, improving 
communications with the customer, developing better performance measurement systems, changing sales 
force compensation to be based on profitability and changing the relationship personnel are strategies for 
turning around underperforming customer relationships. 
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Theory and Evidence on the Liability of Relationship Commitment: Towards an Understanding of 
Why Vendor Firms Persist in Underperforming Customer Relationships 
 
Relationship marketing scholars have long noted the benefits of long-term customer relationships in 
business markets.  Relational elements such as long-term orientation have been found to enhance the 
performance outcomes of buyer-seller relationships (Noordewier, John, and Nevin 1990).  Anderson and 
Weitz (1992) who refer to a long-term orientation in a relationship as “commitment,” suggest that mutual 
commitment results in customer and vendor firms working together to better serve customer needs and 
increase profitability.  Ganesan (1994) identifies competitive advantage derived from information on best-
selling products and competitive activity, better cooperative advertising, and special displays for 
merchandise as some of the suppliers’ benefits from long-term relationships with retailers.  Finally, Kalwani 
and Narayandas (1995) find empirical evidence of pay-off for industrial vendors who persist in long-term 
customer relationships.  Such evidence, and the belief that it is less expensive and consequently more 
profitable to serve existing customers than to acquire new ones, accounts for the prevailing wisdom that 
vendors should focus on retaining their current customers (e.g., Reichheld and Teal 1996).     
Other evidence, however, raises questions about the wisdom of persisting in long-term relationships 
with all customers.  Shapiro et al. (1987) found a wide dispersion in revenues and costs-to-serve across 
customer accounts of industrial marketing firms in commoditized markets.  More recently, Reinhartz and 
Kumar (2000) found that in non-contractual buyer-seller relationships long-life customers are not more 
profitable (contradicting a basic tenet of relationship marketing) and Niraj, Gupta and Narasimhan (2001) 
have documented a significant number of unprofitable customer relationships.  Studies of customer 
profitability that use activity-based management systems have demonstrated that even a few 
underperforming customer relationships can significantly affect a vendor’s overall profits (e.g., Kaplan and 
Cooper 1998).  Such findings notwithstanding, evidence abounds that vendor firms continue to be committed 
to underperforming customer relationships.     
The limited research on relationship dissolution has viewed the process to be unilateral and initiated 
as a consequence of one party’s dissatisfaction with the other, the dwindling benefits derived from the 
relationship, and the high costs of its continuation (Dwyer, Schurr, and Oh 1987).  Among the forces that can 
strain a relationship are higher transaction costs, elimination of obstacles to interacting with alternative 
exchange partners, and changing personal or organizational needs that diminish the value of rewards.  That 
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firms tend to persist in relationships that they perceive are not going too well is variously attributed to 
economic and psychological stress (Bloom, Asher, and White 1978; Hill, Rubin, and Peplau 1976).  Dwyer, 
Schurr, and Oh (1987) have found uncoupling from a relationship with a high degree of interdependence can 
render transaction-specific investments redundant or leave deep sentimental scars.  According to Gundlach, 
Achrol and Mentzer (1995) “commitment curtails the exploration of alternatives; committed partners tend to 
forgo exploring alternative relationships and rewards.”  Persisting in an underperforming relationship, 
therefore, in addition to being a drain on resources, also affects a vendor’s ability to search out and allocate 
resources to more attractive opportunities.  Understanding a vendor’s engagement process in an 
underperforming customer relationship not only yields a rationale for its commitment, but is clearly an 
important step towards improving vendor performance at the individual customer level, and, in turn, overall 
vendor profitability.  Yet, marketing research in customer relationship management has paid little or no 
attention to these issues (Gassenheimer, Houston and Davis 1998).1 
Against this backdrop, the main objective of this paper is to develop and empirically test a 
conceptual model of vendor commitment to underperforming customer relationships.  Specifically, our goal 
is to better understand why vendors continue to be committed to relatively underperforming customer 
relationships.  Recognizing that underperformance can be measured in a variety of ways, we focus on 
relationships within firms’ customer portfolios that exhibit below-average profit performance.2  Resources 
invested in such relationships that could potentially be invested in other, more profitable customer 
relationships, represent an opportunity cost to a vendor firm. Following the integrative tradition in marketing 
(Kerin 1996), we draw on a review of marketing, sociology, organization theory, and social psychology 
literatures and multiple, in-depth, field-based case studies to build a conceptual model and development of 
hypotheses that relate investment, performance, relationship, and organizational factors to vendor 
commitment to underperforming customer relationships.  We empirically tested these hypotheses with data 
collected from 214 underperforming customer relationships and 168 above-average performance customer 
relationships.  Finally, we explored managers’ perception of the effectiveness of commonly used strategies to 
                                                          
1The authors offer practical recommendations for handling customers profitably.  Recently, for example, firms have 
begun to discriminate amongst customers based on customer value and potential to impact firm profits in providing 
customer service (Brady 2000; Zeithaml, Rust, and Lemon 2001).  
2 That underperforming customers are of below-average profitability in a vendor firm’s customer portfolio does not 
necessarily mean that these customer relationships are unprofitable.   
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turn around underperforming customer relationships using a sample of 47 managers.  Cumulatively, our 
work contributes to an important but under-researched area in customer management. 
Gaps in the Extant Literature on Commitment in Buyer-seller Relationships 
Besides trust, commitment is the most commonly used construct by which we attempt to understand 
firm behavior in industrial buyer-seller relationships.  Extant research has identified a number of antecedents 
of vendor commitment in customer relationships (cf., Gundlach, Achrol, and Mentzer 1995; Morgan and 
Hunt 1994).  Studies have also investigated the impact of transaction-specific assets (e.g., Anderson and 
Weitz 1989, 1992), trust (Ganesan 1994; Morgan and Hunt 1994), dependence (Anderson and Narus 1990), 
and relational norms (Heide and John 1988) on relationship commitment.  Although these studies provide 
useful insights, there are gaps in our current understanding of the antecedents of commitment, particularly as 
relates to situations in which increased commitment might not be the most desirable outcome.    
A multiplicity of theories can enhance our understanding of the phenomenon of commitment, 
especially in underperforming relationships.  For example, research in sociology has modeled inter-
organizational relationship stability (such as is evidenced in buyer-supplier relationships) as a function of 
power, competition, and institutional forces (Baker, Faulkner and Fisher 1998; Lawler and Yoon 1996).  
Similarly, research in social psychology has modeled commitment as a function of satisfaction, attractiveness 
of alternatives, exit costs, and personal and social comparison (Rusbalt and Buunk 1993; Cox, Wexler, 
Rusbult, and Gaines 1997).  Although work in marketing has incorporated some of these constructs, 
examining them in the context of underperforming relationships might reveal nuances and lend greater 
explanatory power to our current understanding of commitment. 
Viewing commitment to underperforming relationships as “throwing good money after bad,”the 
sizeable literature on escalating commitment (cf., Staw and Ross 1987, 1993; Brockner and Rubin 1985 for 
reviews) suggests new variables that might help to explain firms’ continued commitment to underperforming 
customer relationships.  Similarly, behavioral decision theory applications to escalating commitment or 
entrapment (Brockner 1992; Schwenk 1986) suggest cognitive biases and decision traps that drive firms to 
persist in such relationships.  Few marketing studies offer insights derived from such variables. 
Although research has examined the influence of transaction-specific investments (TSI) on 
relationship commitment, studies have only recently begun to focus on relevant contextual factors.  Jap and 
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Ganesan (2000), for example, examine the moderating role of relationship stage on the impact of various TSI 
forms on relationship commitment.  This is a welcome foray, but other contextual factors (e.g., relationship 
performance-related) also warrant attention. 
Excepting a recent study that explored the dark side of long-term relationships (Grayson and Ambler 
1999), marketing research has largely viewed commitment under a halo.  With articles and theoretical 
paradigms that emphasize the beneficial effects of buyer-supplier relationships (e.g., Morgan and Hunt 1994; 
Ganesan 1994; Anderson and Weitz 1989) far outnumbering those that even hint at caution, we lack a 
balanced perspective to appropriately guide theory and practice (Vaughan 1999).    
There is clearly a need for research that (a) explains vendor firms’ persistence in underperforming 
customer relationships in terms of new antecedents of commitment as identified in other research streams, 
and (b) studies the differential impact, if any, of these antecedents across healthy as well as underperforming 
customer relationships.  We employ an emergent theory approach that builds on both extant and qualitative 
field research (Eisenhardt 1989) to develop a conceptual model of the antecedents of vendor commitment 
and hypothesize their directional impact.          
Conceptual Model Development Methodology 
Drawing on observations from extant research has been the dominant approach to hypothesis 
building in marketing.  But in the wake of  Deshpande’s (1982) call for triangulation in theory generation, a 
number of studies have supplemented the traditional methodology with an iterative, discovery-oriented 
approach (e.g., Parasuraman, Zeithaml and Berry 1985; Kohli and Jaworski 1990; Menon et al. 1999). This 
theory building approach possesses a greater likelihood of generating well-developed constructs, testable 
hypotheses and novel theory that closely mirrors reality (Eisenhardt 1989; Cameron and Quinn 1988).  
“Qualitative data,” Jick (1979) maintains, “are useful for understanding the rationale or theory underlying 
relationships revealed in the quantitative data or may suggest directly theory which can then be strengthened 
by quantitative support.” 
 Our preliminary research and experience suggesting that a single, simple explanation of firms’ 
commitment to underperforming customer relationships would not suffice, we drew on extant research and 
from multiple, in-depth, field-based case studies we conducted to develop our model.  Each of the latter 
focuses on customer management issues that are relevant to this study.  The cases were chosen on the basis 
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of theoretical rather than statistical sampling (Glaser and Strauss 1967), that is, they were selected not 
randomly, but to reflect a broad coverage of organizations.  The case studies embody a large number of 
buyer-seller relationships across a spectrum of products and services from custom to standard, a range of 
industries from high-tech to traditional, and size asymmetries that favor both seller and buyer.  Subject firms 
included a large electronic parts supplier that sold to large industrial customers, a small specialty engineering 
products manufacturer that sold to large customers in a variety of industries, a large supplier of telecom 
equipment that sold to large- and medium-sized customers in the telecommunications business, a small 
furniture and cabinet manufacturer that sold semi- to fully- customized products to commercial and 
residential developers and construction contractors, and a large electrical parts distributor that had set up a 
national accounts program to sell to large industrial customers.   
Interviewing managers was the primary method of data collection employed in the case studies.  
Supplementary secondary data were derived from annual reports, company documents, memos, business 
press articles, internal consulting reports, and observation of internal staff meetings.   
In developing the model presented in Figure 1, we merged the antecedents identified in our field 
research with variables identified by extant research in buyer-supplier relationships, market orientation, 
activity based management; and escalation of commitment.   Eisenhardt (1989) argues that drawing from 
both a priori theory and field research yields constructs that are more accurately measured and have a 
stronger empirical grounding.   
Conceptual Model and Hypotheses  
The various antecedents of vendor firms’ commitment to underperforming customer relationships 
identified in Figure 1 can be categorized as relationship-, performance-, organization-, and investments-
related.  The relationship marketing literature and our qualitative research provide evidence for including 
relationship-related variables.  Consequently, our model includes vendors’ account management and 
customer related factors.  The activity based management literature, prospect theory-based escalation of 
commitment literature, and our field research support the categorization of performance-related variables.  
Merging the market orientation and decision traps literatures provides theoretical support for the inclusion of 
factors that capture the people, process, and systems components of organization-related factors.  Finally, the 
transaction cost economies-based buyer-supplier relationship literature, escalation of commitment literature, 
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and our field research suggest that the nature and level of relationship investments are important antecedents 
of commitment.   
We also include in our model, as controls, factors (including trust, conflict, comparison levels of 
alternatives, competitive intensity, environmental uncertainty, asset specificity, and affective commitment) 
that have been shown to influence the long-term orientation of firms’ relationships.   
Relationship-related Factors 
Customer account reputation.  In markets characterized by information asymmetry, customers face an 
adverse selection problem in distinguishing quality vendors from others (Akerlof 1970).  Concomitantly, 
quality vendors face the challenge of distinguishing their product offerings from lower-quality offerings.  
The extant literature posits as one possible solution to adverse selection designing signals that reveal private 
information about vendors’ inherent characteristics (Milgrom and Roberts 1986; Misra, Heide and Cort 
1998).  Such a signal might be the presence of buyers of high repute in a vendor’s customer portfolio.  A 
proxy signal of quality, these customers legitimize vendor firms in the eyes of other potential customers 
(Oliver 1990).  In our field research, the electronics parts supplier according to two of its client managers 
followed such a strategy. 
We have stayed in a couple of customer relationships even though they are not performing well 
because they are our “showcase” accounts.  Having GE as a customer gives us a lot of credibility to 
the marketplace.  We can use them as a reference to get sales from other customers.  As you would 
expect, these customers usually know how important they are to us and extract substantial 
concessions.  We end up paying for the privilege of doing business with these large customers. 
 
There are some relationships that define who we are.  We are not going to get out of those 
relationships even if they are not as profitable as our other customer relationships. 
 
We therefore expect vendor firms to continue in underperforming relationships with highly reputed 
customer firms that possess “signal/showcase” and referral value in the market.   
H1:  The greater a customer firm’s reputation, the greater a vendor firm’s commitment to an 
underperforming relationship with it.   
 
Continuity of personnel.  The continuity of personnel may be related to commitment due to trust, 
attachment and moral hazard related reasons.  First, a salesperson’s job is not only to persuade customers to 
purchase the firm’s products, but also to cultivate the customer’s trust.  Trust does not develop overnight; 
long-term relationships provide buyers with sufficient data points to assess a salesperson’s capability, 
reliability, and tendency towards opportunism and predict future behavior (Lindskold 1978).  Salesperson-
  
 
7
engendered trust strongly influences buyers’ loyalty to the vendor (Doney and Cannon 1997).  Consequently, 
in most organizations, a single person plays a key role in customer acquisition and relationship maintenance. 
Second, such relationships, however, are occasions for inter-personal attachments among boundary 
personnel. Institutional theory suggests that individual (personal) attachments between customer and vendor 
personnel become embedded preserving the continuity of the relationship (Abrahamson and Forbrun 1994; 
Baker, Faulkner, and Fisher 1998).  An empirical study has demonstrated that individual attachments reduce 
the likelihood of switching behavior in auditor-client relationships (Seabright, Levinthal and Fichman 1992).   
P&G is known to routinely change its buyers’ vendor portfolios specifically to forestall the development of 
vendor relationships that might yield sub-optimal terms (Shapiro et al. 1987).  Third, salespeople being the 
primary interface with customers (Krafft 1999), agency theory predicts that the potential for moral hazard 
increases to the extent that a salesperson puts his/her best interest ahead of that of the firm (Misra, Heide, and 
Cort 1998).  Shirking and self-interest oriented behavior is manifested as a salesperson continuing a 
relationship despite poor performance that might be perceived to reflect badly on the salesperson’s 
performance (Harrison and Harrel 1993).  The head of sales for the telecom equipment manufacturer had this 
to say about a relationship driven by an embedded personal attachment.  
We had a customer relationship that was very unprofitable.  I kept asking the sales rep to give me his 
plan of action and he repeatedly asked for more time and resources to turn things around.  Things 
only got worse over time.  Yet the sales rep was just not willing to let go of the customer given the 
long relationship he had with the organization and the people.  The customer was in deep financial 
trouble and just couldn’t afford to pay the price premium that our products typically receive in the 
marketplace.  Further, not only was the sales rep doing his best to give them a price break; he was 
also offering them a lot of service free of charge just to keep their business.  When I finally pulled 
him out of the account the new account manager, who had no emotional baggage to carry, came back 
within a month and informed me that there was no way things were going to improve in the 
relationship and that we should get out of the relationship.  I think this was the right decision. 
 
We thus expect that: 
H2:  Continuity in a vendor’s account management personnel tends to engender greater vendor commitment 
to an underperforming relationship.   
 
Relationship age.  Experience with a partner builds trust, enhances relationship quality, and promotes 
commitment (Anderson and Weitz 1989; Ganesan 1994; Kumar, Scheer and Steenkamp 1995).  In a vendor 
relationship it avoids the liability of newness, deepens understanding of customer and the relationship 
idiosyncrasies and nurtures inter-personal trust among the personnel involved in the relationship.  From a 
customer retention economics perspective, longer duration relationships are expected to lower the cost to 
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serve customers and dispose them to pay higher prices for the firms’ products or services (Reichheld and 
Teal 1996; Sheth and Parvatiyar 1995).  We therefore expect that: 
H3:  The age of an underperforming customer relationship is positively related to the vendor firm’s 
commitment to the relationship. 
 
Relationship importance.  The resources firms need to acquire and maintain to survive are found in their 
macro environment (Pfeffer and Salancik 1978).  Customers being a critical source of the revenues (needed 
to fund resource acquisition), the greater the revenue a customer represents, the greater the potential for 
acquiring resources.  Competition plays a spoiler role; when resources are captured by targeting and 
attracting the biggest customers and destabilizing long-term relationships (Keep, Hollander and Dickinson 
1998; Baker, Faulkner and Fisher 1998), lost customers, and the revenues for which they accounted, must be 
replaced.  The experience of a national account manager for the electrical parts supplier is illustrative. 
This was our biggest customer.  The customer’s engineering department was no longer interested in 
the product because there were little or no technological challenges for them to work on.  They had 
handed over the primary responsibility of managing the relationship to the purchasing group.  The 
customer’s buying group was only interested in beating us down on price.  But the customer now 
accounted for over a third of our sales.  We knew that it would be very difficult to replace the 
volume if we lost the customer.  Even though we knew that the relationship was not doing well, we 
were not going to get out of it.  We preferred to fool ourselves into believing that we could make 
things better.  But the writing was on the wall. 
 
Consequently, we expect that: 
H4:  The greater the fraction of a vendor’s revenues accounted for by an underperforming customer 
relationship, the greater a vendor firm’s commitment to it.   
 
Performance-related Factors 
 
Ease of measurement:  Although the ability to measure performance at the individual customer level is 
prerequisite to managing customers profitably, contemporary financial reporting systems used by vendor 
firms typically lack this capability (Niraj, Gupta, and Narasimhan 2001). That a customer relationship’s 
value to a vendor is rarely constant and can change for such reasons as shifts in relational objectives, 
emergence of external factors, or partner complacency (Gasenheimer, Houston, and Davis 1998) further 
complicates matters.  With an incomplete picture of the difficult situation because of inadequate performance 
measurement systems, a vendor is not likely to take necessary corrective action (Rangan, Moriarty, and 
Swartz 1992).  Our field investigations at an electrical parts distributor mirror these expectations. 
In one of our larger customer accounts, in addition to the relationships at the headquarters level, we 
had established local implementation team members within the various branches that included the 
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branch manager, account representative, and inside sales representative and the customer’s 
purchasing, electrical storeroom, engineering, and inventory maintenance divisions.  These teams 
were responsible for administering day-to-day operations and monitoring the progress.  With so 
many people involved it was very difficult to keep track of how well we were doing.  Data at such a 
granular level was very hard to come by.  Even though it appeared that things were going well based 
on historical sales and profitability measures, sitting at the corporate headquarters I was not able to 
pinpoint the current health of the relationship and project its course.  Later on I found out that all the 
action being taken at the branch level was not well received by the customer.  Without this 
knowledge, I stayed in the relationship until it was too late.  By the time I pulled back we had stayed 
too long in the relationship. 
 
We therefore hypothesize that: 
 
H5:   The better a vendor’s performance measurement system, the lower the vendor’s commitment to stay in 
an underperforming customer relationship.   
 
Performance stability. The perception among managers that the nature of the current situation is temporary 
is cited by the extant literature as one of the main reasons for escalating commitment to losing courses of 
action. Project setbacks are often attributed by managers to exogenous factors that are temporary in nature, 
unusually poor weather or a temporary raw material supply shortage, for example (Staw and Ross 1987).  
Temporary problems rarely justify quitting a project in mid-stream, the future being expected to be brighter.  
The willingness to ride out the short-term period of poor performance was echoed in several of our field 
investigation case sites. Observed, for example, the field service manager for the electrical parts supplier: 
The most important reason we stay in an underperforming relationship is the expectation we have 
that things will get better in the future and the current state of affairs is a temporary one.  In our 
quarterly sales forecast meetings this is the most common reasoning our salespeople give us to 
justify continued investments in a relationship that is performing below par.  They know that the 
promise of a better future is the best way to get us to continue providing support for their accounts 
instead of pulling the plug. 
 
We therefore conclude that: 
 
H6:  The greater the expectation of eventual stability in performance, the greater a vendor’s commitment to 
stay in an underperforming customer relationship.   
 
Nature of performance change.  Our field investigations revealed the old adage of the boiled frog to be an 
appropriate metaphor for explaining the relationship between the nature of performance change and 
commitment to underperforming relationships.3  The commonly pursued practice of management by 
exception focuses on things and events that are not behaving “normally” (Schoeffler 1991).  Our field 
                                                          
3 When a frog is dropped into a pot of scalding water it will sense the danger and immediately jump out. However, if a 
frog is dropped into a pot of tepid water and the water temperature gradually raised the frog succumbs rather than tries 
to escape. 
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investigations revealed that managers monitoring relationship performance and deciding where to channel 
limited resources tended to notice primarily big and drastic changes.  Small and gradual changes in 
relationship performance, especially if spread over a long period of time, seldom received managerial 
attention.  In the absence of touchstone or defining events vendor firms are unlikely to detect deteriorating 
performance and, hence, are likely to remain committed to a relationship.  Observed the head of sales at the 
specialty engineering products vendor in our field investigation: 
It is a lot easier to terminate a relationship when we can pinpoint specific actions or incidents that led 
to the current state...  For example, when a customer pushes hard on dramatic price reductions, or 
they close down some plants and there is a large drop in volumes, then it is easy to decide that we 
stop serving the customer.  If, on the other hand, the performance deteriorates very slowly then we 
might miss the change for a long time and land up staying in the customer relationship. 
 
The client manager for the telecom equipment manufacturer echoed a complementary sentiment: 
There was this case where we thought we were doing a good job serving a customer.  In reality there 
were minor quality and service slip-ups that we didn’t notice and that the customer never pointed 
out.  They expressed their dissatisfaction by slowly reducing our share of their total purchases and 
cutting prices gradually over time.  We were under the impression that the reduced volumes were 
more a reflection of a reduction in the customers’ total purchases and the overall economic 
environment.  We continued in the relationship expecting things to turn around with the business 
cycle.  By the time we figured out the true situation, things had gone too far. 
 
We therefore expect that: 
 
H7:  The slower the rate of decline in performance in an underperforming customer relationship, the more 
likely the vendor to remain committed to the relationship.   
 
Organization-related Factors 
Visibility of relationship.   Self-justification theory posits that individuals pledge to a course of action (even 
with the potential downside of negative outcomes) to justify prior behavior (Staw and Fox 1977). Persistence 
in a course of action is heightened still further when it is public and visible (Brockner, Rubin and Lang 1981; 
Staw and Ross 1987).  This was the circumstance related by the CEO of the electronic parts supplier. 
We are having an interesting experience with an underperforming relationship with one of our long-
standing customers.  This was one of the first customers of the firm and everyone in our firm had 
grown up on stories of how we did business with them.  Even today this relationship still has a lot of 
visibility within the firm.  Everybody wants to know about what is going on in this relationship.  The 
problem is that the relationship has not been doing well in the recent past.  Getting out of this 
relationship has become difficult because no one wants to be responsible for this decision.   
 
The high social anxiety that attends visible, high profile relationships and consequent retrospective 
rationality and face-saving behavior invoked to justify them lead us to expect that:  
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H8:  The greater the visibility of an underperforming customer relationship, the greater a vendor’s 
commitment to it.   
 
Senior management involvement.  As senior managers’ involvement in a customer relationship signals its 
importance to the rest of the organization, mid-level managers are reluctant to be bearers of bad news even 
when a relationship is performing poorly.  Concluded the CEO of the cabinet and furniture manufacturer: 
The whole organization knew that things were getting out of control in the relationship.  Yet, 
because this customer was my responsibility, no one was willing to tell either the customer or me 
that their demands were unreasonable and that their business was turning out to be highly 
unprofitable for us.  I am to blame here because I had made a big deal about how important it was for 
everybody to make sure that we kept this customer happy. 
 
The escalation literature, moreover, suggests that managers who “stick to their guns” even when the 
odds of success are bleak are likely to be viewed as heroes and come in for special praise (Staw and Ross 
1980; Evans and Medcof 1986).  If commitment to underperforming relationships is viewed as heroic, their 
termination might require the intervention of senior management.  “Whenever we have to fire a customer I 
have found that I need to be involved in the decision,” explained the CEO of the cabinet and furniture 
manufacturer. 
None of my line managers want to take on the task of terminating a customer relationship.  I need to 
do the dirty work – to look the customer in the eye and tell them that we cannot afford to do business 
with them anymore.  If I don’t get involved in a low profitability account, then we will stay in the 
relationship for a lot longer than necessary. 
 
Given these competing expectations we do not posit a directional hypothesis.  Instead, we conclude: 
H9:  Senior management involvement in an underperforming customer relationship relates directly to 
vendor commitment to the relationship.   
 
Customer retention orientation.  The behavior of customer-retention oriented firms reflects the goals of 
increasing customer satisfaction and loyalty going awry.  When customer-retention orientation becomes 
institutionalized, customer relationship termination and discriminating across customers can become almost 
unthinkable propositions (Goodman, Bazerman and Conlon 1980). “We encourage our people to build 
customer relationships and retain customers,” reflected the CEO of the electrical parts supplier. 
Going the extra mile to keep our loyal customers happy is a common occurrence.  We make it a 
point to preach to every new employee that customer satisfaction is the ultimate goal of the firm.  If 
we have happy customers, then they will reward us handsomely over time.  We know that this could 
mean that we have a bunch of unprofitable customers that we should have stopped serving.  But that 
is the cost of doing business.  Given our singular focus on customer retention, I would bet that for 
every one of the unprofitable customer relationships that we continue to stay in, there must be five 
others that we are doing well.  I can live with that. 
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Our field research findings thus lead us to posit that: 
H10:  The more a vendor firm’s customer- retention orientation the greater the vendor’s commitment to an 
underperforming customer relationship.   
 
Risk taking orientation.   Organizations that encourage and even incent employees to take risks are 
rewarded with creative behaviors (Andrews and Smith 1996), those that discourage risk-taking are penalized 
with conservative and undifferentiated strategies that tend not to question the conventional wisdom.  A risk 
averse strategy that conforms to conventional wisdom would encourage retention and management of an 
underperforming customer relationship.   An atypical response such as relationship termination is likely only 
when employees are confident that senior management will not unjustly penalize such actions.  The head of 
sales for the electrical parts supplier echoed this expectation: 
As a firm we encourage our sales managers to be aggressive and take chances.  I have a mantra for 
our sales organization that is “no one will be punished for firing a customer.”  Losing a customer is 
not viewed negatively by anyone as long as they can prove that the relationship was going to hurt 
rather than help us.  Because of that even our lower level managers are not scared to be tough 
negotiators.  They will put the firm’s interests before those of the customer. 
 
We therefore hypothesize that: 
H11:  The greater a vendor firm’s risk taking orientation, the lower its commitment to underperforming 
customer relationships.   
 
Investments-related Factors 
Co-development. Co-development refers to collaborative efforts of two firms in a relationship that yield 
customized products/or solutions that could not have been developed by either firm in isolation.  Firms adapt 
to and learn from one another and share knowledge effectively only over time (Milgrom and Roberts 1991; 
Powell, Kopult, and Smith-Doerr 1996).  Co-development initiatives thus commit two parties to remain in a 
relationship even if it is underperforming.  Observed the customer relationship manager for the telecom 
equipment supplier in our case study, 
Past collaborative efforts with the customer in developing new product or service or customizing 
solutions to their needs tend to make us stay longer in these relationships even if they are 
underperforming relationships.  It is as if we think that the customer is going to be more interested in 
making the relationship work and therefore we feel comfortable with the decision to stay.  I also 
think that through the collaborative efforts we get so close to the customer that it prevents us from 
being objective about the relationship termination decision. 
 
We therefore expect that:  
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H12:  The greater the co-development activities in an underperforming customer relationship, the greater the 
vendor’s commitment to stay in the relationship. 
 
Efficaciousness.  Efficacious investments are those made with the expectation that they will turn around 
poor performance.  Belief in the efficacy of investments might be motivated by biases in managerial 
judgment (Staw and Ross 1989).  The psychology literature posits that managers operate under an illusion of 
control, whereby individual managers expect greater personal success than objective probability warrants 
(Langer 1975) and that relationship personnel will manage communication such that investments initiated by 
them are viewed by the firm as efficacious and likely to turn performance around (Schwenk 1986; Staw and 
Ross 1989). An instance of this is related by a NAM in the electrical parts supplier case study.   
The relationship was in trouble.  We made a sincere effort to improve and undertook a number of 
initiatives to turn the relationship around.  For example, we invested in better forecasting systems to 
help predict changes in demand.  We also put in a lot of effort to change the product specifications to 
better meet the customer’s needs.  Yet, the relationship (not the customer) continued to flounder.  By 
this time, all the investments we had made over the previous six months became the very reason for 
us to stay in the relationship.  The belief that these investments would turn the relationship around 
was so high that the account management team felt justified in their decision to not quit. 
      
We therefore state that: 
H13:  The greater the level of efficacious investment in an underperforming customer relationship, the 
greater the vendor’s commitment to stay in the relationship.   
 
Asset specificity:  The transactions cost economics literature characterizes as transaction-specific 
investments that are idiosyncratic to a relationship and have no value outside of the relationship (Heide and 
John 1988; Anderson and Weitz 1992).  Examples include investments in training a customer’s employees, 
dedicated warehouses, and software modified to meet a customer’s needs.  Such relationship-specific 
investments, albeit made with the objective of generating greater returns, make a vendor firm a hostage to the 
relationship.  We therefore expect that: 
H14.  Higher levels of transaction specific investments in an underperforming relationship lead to greater 
vendor commitment to the relationship. 
 
Resource commitment.  The relationship marketing literature treats resource commitment as a precursor to 
relationship commitment (Morgan and Hunt 1994).  Similarly, interdependence theory suggests that as 
investments in relationships increase, they become exit barriers that reduce the likelihood of dissolution 
(Rusbult and Buunk 1993; Cox et. al 1997).  Managers feel compelled to continue in a relationship to which 
high levels of resources have been committed.  Their need to recoup investments regardless of their utility 
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can be viewed as a crude form of mental accounting (Heath 1995).  In experimental studies, Arkes and 
Blumer (1985) find that those who invest money in a project are the most likely to be at the venture’s 
completion.  Consistent with these findings, the CEO of the cabinet and furniture manufacturer noted, 
We have found that we tend to stay longer in those underperforming customer relationships where 
both sides have made significant investments…. the high level of investments acts like a millstone 
around our necks.  Nobody wants to abandon a relationship when they know that a lot has gone into 
setting it up.  Interestingly, when a lot has been invested, the fact that it is difficult to get out 
becomes a reassurance, in itself, for both sides that things will only get better since it is in 
everybody’s interests to make things work in the relationship. 
 
   We therefore expect that: 
H15:  The greater the resources committed to an underperforming customer relationship, the greater the 
vendor commitment to stay in the relationship. 
 
Controls 
 Also included in the development of our model are a number of variables considered endemic to 
relationship development, maintenance, and sustenance (Morgan and Hunt 1994; Weitz and Jap 1995). 
Controlling for these variables provides a stronger test of the theory developed in the model. 
Competition is a market hazard that has the potential to entice customers away from existing 
vendors.  Greater competition should thus be expected to reduce relationship longevity.  Especially then, in 
mature markets, in which maintaining market share is often a paramount goal, managers are likely to do 
anything to maintain the relationships and prevent competitors from gaining a foothold in their accounts 
(Armstrong and Collopy 1996; Keep, Hollander and Dickinson 1998).   Environmental turbulence and 
consequent uncertainty can affect a firm’s supply of resources (Pfeffer and Salancik 1978). Consequently, 
vendor firms attempt to safeguard their relationship resources by engaging in repeat transactions or long-term 
relationships with their customers (Ganesan 1994; Frazier and Antia 1995).  But in uncertain environments 
firms want to be flexible and not locked into relationships in uncertain environments (Dwyer and Oh 1987).   
Conflict is viewed by the power and dependence research stream as antecedent to a firm’s exiting a 
relationship (Frazier 1999).  The attractiveness of alternatives has been shown to be a strong predictor of 
switching behavior (Thibaut and Kelley 1959; Anderson and Narus 1984).  Firms are more likely to redeploy 
resources from underperforming customer relationships in the presence of attractive alternatives.    
Relationships in their later stages become more susceptible to negative influences (such as lack of 
objectivity, me-too thinking, and staleness in value creation) that dampen the positive impact of relational 
  
 
15
factors (Moorman, Zaltman, and Deshpandé 1992; Grayson and Ambler 1999).  Specifically, relationships in 
the decline stage exhibit diminished inter-personal trust and concerns about protecting individual investments 
and maximizing individual returns (Jap and Ganesan 2000).  Trust is a cornerstone variable in the study of 
buyer-supplier relationships (Spekman 1988). The extant literature views trust as a major determinant of 
commitment (Achrol 1991; Moorman, Zaltman, and Deshpandé 1992), theorizing that since commitment 
entails vulnerability, parties seek only trustworthy partners (Morgan and Hunt 1994).    We included 
affective commitment as a control because the relationship marketing literature deems it to be antecedent to 
relationship commitment (Gundlach, Achrol, and Mentzer 1995). 
Data and Method 
Participants in an executive program served as key informants from whom we solicited responses 
about customer relationships.4   Respondents were offered a brief, customized benchmark analysis in return 
for their participation. Responses were sought about a customer relationship that was performing below 
average in the informant’s firm’s customer portfolio (i.e., registered in the bottom two quartiles in 
profitability).   This is a relative measure of performance within each firm’s customer portfolio and not an 
indicator of profitability.   The selection criteria also required that key informants be knowledgeable about 
the relationship.  Finally, the respondents were ensured confidentiality. 
The final sample of 214 customer relationships of average length 9.83 years accounted for, on 
average, about 13.22% and 7.8% of the vendors’ revenues and profits, respectively. For the median vendor in 
the sample, the four largest customers provided 46%-60% of revenues and market share in the range of 21%-
35%.  The Herfindahl index of four-firm concentration ratio was in the range of 61%-75% and the market 
was growing annually at 6% - 10%.  
Measures 
When available, existing measures were adapted for use in our study.  For constructs for which there 
were no existing scales, development was guided by conceptual definitions in the literature and our field 
research. The following process was used to develop the new scales.  A pool of items was generated for 
measuring each of the constructs. These items were then pretested in three distinct steps: (1) face-to-face 
interviews with a small sample of managers, (2) face-to-face interviews with three academic experts, and (3) 
                                                          
4 Such an approach to collect data appears to be gaining precedence (see Fisher, Maltz, and Jaworski 1997). 
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a pilot survey of 30 managers. At each stage, participants were asked to point out ambiguities and potential 
sources of confusion and evaluate the items for face validity.  Items that were deemed troublesome and 
confusing were revised and eliminated and replaced with new items. After the completion of the three steps, 
the participants indicated little difficulty with the scales or tasks.  
Table 1 presents descriptive characteristics of the scales; the Appendix lists the items we used for all 
the variables, the source of the scales and the scale reliability.  Characteristics of the dependent variable and 
those developed for this study follow. Relationship commitment, the dependent variable, adapted from 
Morgan and Hunt (1994), reflects conceptualizations in the marketing literature (Noordewier, John, and 
Nevin 1990; Anderson and Weitz 1989; Kumar, Scheer, and Steenkamp 1995). The seven-item measure 
incorporates the vendor’s perception of both its own and the customer’s continuity intentions.  An 
examination of its descriptive properties indicates that social desirability bias is not present, the mean for 
relationship commitment of 4.86 and range of 1.42 to 7 being similar to the descriptive statistics in previous 
work (e.g., Morgan and Hunt 1994; Kumar, Scheer, and Steenkamp 1995).  Performance-related factors were 
measured using four-item scales and were designed to capture the nature of performance measurement as 
conceptualized in the escalation of commitment and reinforcement-expectancy literatures (cf. Staw and Ross 
1987; Cyert and March 1963). Among the organizational and relationship investment factors, visibility of the 
relationship and efficacious investment reflected the conceptualization of the constructs in the escalation of 
commitment (Staw and Ross 1989) and the cognitive literatures (Weick 1993).  A binary response item 
measured involvement of senior management.   
To test for common method bias we followed Posdakoff and Organ (1986) and conducted the 
Harman’s one-factor test.  The result of the principal components analysis revealed eight factors with eigen-
values greater than 1.0 that accounted for 74% of total variance. Of the several factors identified, the first did 
not account for the majority of the variance.  Further, there being no general factor in the unrotated factor 
structure, common method variance did not appear to be a problem (Posdakoff and Organ 1986).  
Results 
Measurement Analysis 
Data collection was followed by an assessment of the uni-dimensionality, reliability, and 
discriminant validity of the measures we used.  Given the large number of constructs and measures, we 
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followed the recommendations in the literature on confirmatory factor analysis that scales be assessed by 
examining smaller confirmatory factor models (cf. Bentler and Chou 1987).  This approach is well 
established in empirical research in marketing (cf. Cannon and Perreault 1999).  Specifically, we conducted 
measure analyses based on groups of related sets of measures: relationship characteristics and controls; 
relationship performance assessment; organizational factors; nature of relationship investments and outcomes 
(affective and continuance commitment).   
The fit of the five models was adequate [Relationship characteristics and controls: χ2= 461.65 with 
215 d.f. (p=0.0001), GFI=0.86, TLI=0.89;CFI=0.92, RMSEA=0.07; Relationship performance assessment: 
χ2= 73.4 with 41d.f. (p=0.0015), GFI=0.95, TLI=0.94;CFI=0.95, RMSEA=0.058; Organizational factors: 
χ2= 178.30 with 87d.f. (p=0.0001), GFI=0.91, TLI=0.91;CFI=0.93, RMSEA=0.07; Nature of relationship 
investments: χ2= 259.17 with 146 d.f.(p=0.0001), GFI=0.89,, TLI=0.89, CFI=0.92, RMSEA=0.06; and 
Outcomes: χ2= 37.41 with 26d.f. (p=0.029), GFI=0.97, TLI=0.99;CFI=0.99, RMSEA=0.058 ].  All the item 
loadings on the respective constructs were statistically significant.  
Reliability estimates for fourteen of sixteen reflective constructs were greater than 0.70 and average 
reliability of 0.79 (see Table1).  The exploratory factor analysis indicated the constructs to be uni-
dimensional (i.e., a single eigen-value greater than one).  To assess discriminant validity we examined 
whether the confidence intervals (+ two standard errors) around the correlation estimates between any two 
factors included 1.0 (Anderson and Gerbing 1988, p.516).  Discriminant validity was upheld as in no case did 
the confidence intervals contain 1.0.  We conducted two-factor confirmatory factor analysis of pairs of 
constructs twice, once constraining the correlation between the latent variables to unity and once freeing the 
parameter.  A chi-square difference test was used to determine whether the chi-square value of the 
unconstrained model was significantly lower, in which case discriminant validity would be upheld. The 
critical value (Δχ2(1)>3.85) indicates discriminant validity in all pairwise tests. 
Regression Analysis  
We used regression analysis to test the hypotheses.  The resulting regression model is: 
Commitment to Stay in Relationship = α + β1 X1 + β2 X2 + β3 X3 + β4 X4 + β5 X5 + β6 X6   + β8 X8 + β9 X9 + 
β10 X10 + β11 X11 + β12 X12 + β13X13 + β14 X14 + β15 X15 + β16 X16 + β17 X17 + β18 X18 + β19X19  +β20X20 + ε 
 
where: 
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X1=Account Reputation    X2=Continuity of personnel  
X3=Relationship age    X4=Relationship importance   
X5=Ease of measurement   X6=Performance stability 
X7=Nature of performance change  X8=Visibility of relationship 
X9=Senior Management Involvement   X10=Customer retention orientation 
X11=Risk taking orientation    X12=Co-development 
X13=Efficaciousness of Investment  X14=Asset specificity   
X15=Resource commitment    X16=Competitive intensity 
X17=Environmental uncertainty   X18=Trust     
X19=Conflict      X20=Comparison of alternatives 
X21=Relationship stage    X23=Affective commitment    
 
The results are reported in Table 2.  An examination of the VIFs revealed no evidence of 
multicollinearity biasing the results. With support for 11 of the 15 hypotheses (73.3%) and significance of 
five of the seven controls we rule out chance as a cause of our results.  The R2 of 63% indicates a satisfactory 
level of explanation of the variance in our dependent variable by the constructs included.   
[Table 2 about here] 
 Among relationship variables, continuity of personnel (β2=0.08, p<0.05) and relationship age 
(β3=0.07, p<0.10) are significant supporting H2 and H3.  Contrary to expectations, H1 and H4 are not 
supported suggesting that customer reputation and relationship importance are not related to vendor 
commitment.  Consistent with hypotheses H6 and H7, performance stability (β6 = -0.10, p<0.05) and nature 
of performance change (β8 = -0.12, p<0.05) had negative effects on vendor commitment. Contrary to H5, 
however, ease of measurement had no effect on commitment.   
All of the organization-related hypotheses (H8-H11) were supported, customer retention orientation 
exhibiting the greatest impact ((β11=0.18, p<0.05).  Although directionality was not posited for H9, the 
results suggest that senior management involvement positively influences vendor commitment in 
underperforming relationships.  Three of the investment-related variables were significant supporting H12, 
H13, and H15. Resource commitment  (β15=0.23, p<0.05) and efficaciousness of investment (β13=0.17, 
p<0.05) had the greatest impact on vendor commitment. Contrary to H14, and the overwhelming evidence 
found in the marketing literature, asset specificity does not have a significant impact on vendor commitment 
in underperforming relationship.5 
                                                          
5 We can rule out multicollinearity as a plausible reason for this result. First the VIFs were well below two. Second, when we 
systematically dropped the other investment-related variables one by one and asset specificity continued to be non-significant. 
  
 
19
Finally, among the controls, competitive intensity, environmental uncertainty, trust, comparison level 
of alternatives, and affective commitment were positively associated with vendor commitment. 
Above-average Performance Customer Relationships 
 Our objective in this paper is to identify the uniqueness of underperforming customer relationships 
and understand the differential impact of the various antecedents of commitment across underperforming and 
healthy customer relationships.  To do so, we also collected data from a sample of 168 above-average 
performance customer relationships using procedures similar to those outlined above.  Barring exceptions, 
the scales were identical; we reworded a few scales to capture the context of above-average performance 
relationships. For example, item 4 of the expectation of performance stability scale was reworded, as “We 
believe the current performance level is a temporary phenomenon.”  Table 3 provides a simple comparison of 
means across the two samples.  Comparing and contrasting the impact of various antecedents gives us an 
opportunity to seek alternative explanations to the fact that some of the hypotheses related to asset 
specificity, ease of measurement, account reputation, and relationship importance which have found support 
in prior research (e.g., Heide and John 1988; Rangan et. al 1992; Misra, Heide and Cort 1992) but were not 
supported in the underperforming customer relationship sample.    
[Table 3 About Here] 
Pairwise test of mean differences indicated that in terms of share of both revenues and profits from 
the focal customer and the ratio of these two factors (vendor profits per sales dollar), firms in the above-
average performance relationship sample enjoyed significantly superior performance.  Moreover, vendor 
commitment (and affective commitment) is significantly higher for the above-average performance sample.  
Among the other variables, resource commitment, relationship visibility, customer orientation culture, 
continuity of personnel, trust, conflict, and comparison of alternatives are also significantly different across 
the two samples.   
 We began with a Chow test to determine whether the two data sets should be pooled.  The F-test 
results were significant, that is, the evidence supported examining the two samples independently.  
Regression results for the above-average performance variables are reported in Table 4.  For relationships in 
this sample, the model explains 63% of the variance in commitment, and, consistent with TCA literature, 
asset specificity and account reputation are positively associated with commitment.  Relationship importance 
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and ease of measurement continue to be non-significant.  The other significant results are largely 
unsurprising, resource commitment, customer oriented culture, relationship age, environmental uncertainty, 
trust, efficacious investment and affective commitment all being associated with commitment. 
[Table 4 About Here] 
Discussion 
Although the relationship marketing research stream has provided numerous insights into regularities 
that explain vendor commitment in customer relationships, important questions remain about the stability of 
customer relationships.  For example, we understand neither why vendor firms stay in underperforming 
customer relationships nor how they deal with such situations.  This study attempts to answer these two 
questions by building an integrative framework that synthesizes rigorous field research with a cross-
functional review of extant literature.  As shown in the hypotheses development section, this use of multiple 
methods strengthened our substantiation of constructs and hypotheses.  The results confirm our expectation 
that a simple, singular explanation will not suffice, and that the complex issue of vendor commitment to 
underperforming customer relationships requires a multifactor explanation.  Our study adds in a novel way to 
theory development in relationship marketing by going beyond the “positive halo” of relationships to 
consider as well the “dark side”.   
From a practical viewpoint, it is clearly recognized that underperforming customer relationships are 
a significant drag on a vendor firm’s profits and that terminating them is not easy (Zeithaml, Rust and Lemon 
2001).6  It is surprising that despite such findings firms retain a significant number of underperforming 
customers in their relationship portfolios.  From a theoretical perspective, this study, being an early attempt 
to understand such commitment, serves as a point of departure for studying how to tackle underperforming 
customer relationships.  
The empirical results also provide substantial support for the comprehensive model developed in 
Figure 1.  Our results are particularly important because these variables play a significant role even in the 
presence of a number of controls that have been suggested in the relationship marketing literature.  
Although relationship variables are clearly the most studied in marketing, this study furthers current 
understanding about their roles.  For example, our finding that personnel continuity prevents firms from 
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extricating themselves from underperforming customer relationships parallels the findings that banks have 
difficulty in terminating “problem” loans (Staw, Barsade, and Koput 1997).  This result also supports 
arguments posed by Macaulay (1963) and others that view the attachment that develops between individuals 
in boundary-spanning roles as a mechanism that goes beyond reducing transaction costs.  Granovetter (1985, 
pg. 490), who argues that there is a departure from pure economic motives in such situations, suggests that 
continuing economic relations often become overlaid with social content that carries strong expectations of 
trust and abstention from opportunism. The non-significance of account reputation refutes the conventional 
wisdom that the legitimization benefits and referral value of such “strategic accounts” justifies the vendor’s 
commitment.    
 Although there is evidence for the role of performance-related variables in the managerial dictum 
that “what gets measured gets managed,” these variables have not been studied in a systematic fashion in 
marketing.  We find that it is not lack of effective performance measurement systems, but expectations of the 
continuity of current performance that leads firms to persist in underperforming relationships.  Our results 
are consistent with the finding that initial belief structures lead to escalation biases in new product decisions 
(Biyalagorsky, Boulding and Staelin 2000).  Moreover, the need for defining events to shake managers into 
action is consistent with the inertia and “status quo” behaviors literatures.   
 The downside of institutionalized beliefs of customer retention orientation evidenced here provides 
contextual relevance for theory of customer orientation. The significance of the other organizational 
variables indicates their potential importance in future studies. 
Beyond the traditional investment-related variables suggested in the relationship marketing and TCA 
literatures (e.g., asset specificity, co-development, and resource commitment), we find that efficaciousness of 
investment is an antecedent of vendor commitment to underperforming relationships.  The non-significance 
of asset specificity might be due to the presence of other, more relevant investment variables in the model or 
to its role being moderated by relationship performance itself.  Our study of superior performing customer 
relationships supports the latter expectation.    
Controls-related results were as expected.  However, the roles of competition, and affective 
commitment warrant further discussion.  Our finding for the role of competition as an antecedent of 
                                                                                                                                                                                                 
6 For example, an industrial heating element manufacturer found that 20% of its customers accounted for 225% of its profits and 10% of 
its customers accounted for 125% of its losses (Kaplan and Cooper 1998). 
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commitment mirrors the findings in marketing strategy that competitiveness leads to sub-optimal decision-
making by managers (Armstrong and Collopy 1996).  In effect, such “competitive grandstanding” can be 
detrimental.  Finally, including affective commitment helps partial out omitted variable bias and thereby 
provides greater result validity.      
While understanding the reasons for vendor firms’ commitment to underperforming relationships is a 
critical first step, the important and associated question of “how do managers turn around underperforming 
relationships?” has not yet been answered.  In an exploratory study, using an approach akin to policy-
capturing methods (Cooksey 1996), we investigated the effectiveness of various actions that vendors take 
subsequent to identifying an underperforming customer relationship. 
Vendor Firms’ Strategies to Handle Underperforming Customer Relationships 
To identify actions that firms take to turnaround underperforming relationships, we first reviewed the 
popular press and then conducted detailed qualitative interviews with more than 30 managers responsible for 
managing customer relationships across a variety of industries.  Our exploratory investigations revealed 
seven common themes.   
First, respondents indicated that they conducted cross-functional reviews of their internal processes 
to identify problem areas that needed to be fixed.  This was deemed to be easy and efficient since it did not 
involve customers.  Second, respondents indicated that they changed the account management team to bring 
a new perspective to a relationship, the wisdom of this being that performance degradation might be due to 
the current account management team’s inability to steer away from a failing course of action.  Third, 
respondents indicated that they tried to justify a customer’s strategic fit with their firm before taking any 
action.  They viewed this information as essential to determining what constituted an appropriate level of 
effort to expend on improving a relationship’s performance.  Fourth, respondents suggested a change in 
compensation as an effective fix.  It was claimed that moving from compensation based on volumes to 
compensation based on profitability more effectively aligned the account management team’s goals with 
those of the firm.  Fifth, believing that relationships often foundered because of a lack of alignment between 
customer expectations and vendor customer management efforts, respondents also suggested the 
development of appropriate relationship performance management systems followed by a periodic review of 
a relationship’s goals and objectives with the customer.  Sixth, periodic discussions of relationship 
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objectives, they maintained, were required to accommodate changes in customer needs over time.  Seventh, 
associated with these initiatives and related to the reframing of goals and objectives, respondents suggested 
that communications be overhauled and sharing of information with customers improved to forestall the 
development of incongruence in goals and objectives across the dyad.    
Given that it has the advantage of not requiring the informant to make trade-offs in directly 
responding about the relative importance of the factors in the model as well lower social desirability bias 
potential and its consequent recent precedence in buyer-seller research (e.g., Murry and Heide 1998; Wathne, 
Biong and Heide 2001), we used a conjoint design to evaluate the broader applicability and relative 
importance of factors identified. 
Development of the Conjoint Scenarios 
Following a fractional factorial design we developed 12 conjoint scenarios (seven factors with two 
levels) based on the formula of minimum scenarios (Curry 1997).7  The seven measures and their associated 
levels are reported in Table 5. 
[Table 5 About Here] 
The final sample comprised 47 respondents attending an executive program.8  The respondents were 
asked to consider an underperforming customer relationship (defined as a customer relationship in the 
bottom 25% of a firm’s customer portfolio in terms of profitability), which had either one of two levels on 
each of the seven factors.  They then responded (on a seven-point scale anchored on “very low likelihood” to 
“very high likelihood”) to the question: “What is the likelihood of the firm turning the customer relationship 
around?”  To reduce bias the respondents were requested to treat each scenario as independent and not refer 
back to scenarios already completed. 
Analysis and Results 
                                                          
7 NC = NL – NA +1, where NL is the total number of attribute levels and NA the total number of attributes in the study.  Based on this 
formula, the minimum number of scenarios is 8 (14-7 +1).  Curry (1997) recommends multiplying this number by 1.5-2, leading to 12 
scenarios.  The 12 preliminary scenarios were pre-tested with six account managers whose feedback was used in the development of the 
final scenarios. 
8 From an initial sample of 52 managers, five respondents were dropped after examining their response to three verification questions. 
The first question assessed their knowledge, on a seven-point scale, of the state of customer relationships in their firms.  The second 
question assessed their involvement in managing customer relationships. The third question assessed their confidence about their 
responses to the scenarios presented.  Managers in the final sample had an average of 13.7 years of experience in managing relationships, 
another proxy for knowledge and the quality of the key informant (Philips 1981). 
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We analyzed the data with OLS regression.  Table 6 presents the results.9 
[Table 6 About Here] 
The results suggest that the model explains a reasonable amount of the variance (adjusted R2=0.20) 
and all factors are statistically significant. The relative importance of the seven factors, however, varies.  
While there is little extant theoretical work on which to develop a priori predictions of the relative 
importance of the seven factors as perceived by managers, the conjoint methodology enables us to assess the 
relative importance ex-post by calculating importance weights (i.e., dividing each factor’s part worth range 
by the sum of all part worth ranges).  The results (reported in Table 6) indicate that managers perceive that 
the most effective way to turn relationships around, is to begin by reframing joint goals and objectives with 
the customer, then improve communications and information exchange and reevaluate internal processes 
using cross-functional teams, and, finally, develop better performance measurement systems and change the 
basis of compensation (which seem to be equally effective).  Surprisingly, managers perceive the ease of 
evaluating the customer’s strategic fit with the firm and changing the account team to be the least important.     
Implications for Practice 
Taken together, the results of the three studies extend our understanding of the antecedents of 
commitment in relationships.  We find that account reputation, and relationship importance do not affect 
vendor commitment to underperforming relationships.  Comparing the impact of these variables across 
underperforming and above-average performance customer relationships provides interesting take-aways. 
• Customer reputation has a significant impact on vendor commitment to above-average performance 
relationships; it does not impact vendor commitment to underperforming relationships.  This result is 
counter to the belief that firms tend to persist in underperforming “showcase” accounts.   
• It is not how big the sales volume, as much as it is the continuity of personnel that determines a vendor 
firm’s level of commitment to a customer relationship.    
 
Our results also suggest that firms need to not just measure and monitor the performance of customer 
relationships but look at the nature of performance change as well.  
• The belief that a relationship’s underperformance is temporary is, as expected, likely to keep vendors in 
underperforming relationships.  Vendors need to validate managers’ expectations before deciding to 
remain committed to such relationships. 
                                                          
9 Except for one factor, we used an effects-coding approach (Cohen and Cohen 1983) with the first level coded –1 (for difficult) and the 
second level coded as +1 (for easy).  For the continuity of account management personnel factor we coded “continuing with the current 
account management personnel” as –1 and “bringing in new personnel” as +1.   
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• Vendor firms need to be careful about their commitment to customer relationships characterized by slow 
performance degradation.    
 
Our study has a number of implications for organization- and relationship-related factors that affect 
vendor firms’ commitment to underperforming relationships. 
• Our finding that greater visibility of a customer relationship impedes a vendor firm’s exit from the 
relationship underscores the importance of understanding the organization-related factors.  Vendors need 
to evaluate high profile customer relationships differently from other relationships.    
• The involvement of senior managers also impedes a vendor’s exit from an underperforming customer 
relationship.  Senior management might be reluctant to withdraw from an underperforming customer 
relationship or be brought in to help the vendor recover from an underperforming relationship. 
• Customer retention orientation might be appropriate in mutually beneficial customer relationships, but 
this orientation can haunt vendors in underperforming customer relationships. The head of sales for an 
electronics part manufacturer offered the following cautionary remark: 
“I had always insisted that customer satisfaction be our number one priority at all times and that 
customer retention was the metric we would use to measure our people’s performance. I should have 
been careful. Trying to work hard to satisfy demanding and unprofitable customers and trying to 
keep them is not worth it.  But we had created an environment where no one wanted to fire a 
customer. We had reached a stage where we were working very hard and expending a lot of effort to 
stay in a bunch of highly unprofitable relationships.”  
• Firing customers is more likely when the organizational environment permits risk-taking behavior.  
Managers evaluated negatively for relationship failure are likely to expend more effort to preserve 
underperforming relationships in the hope that no one will ever notice their poor performance.  
 
Our results also support and extend previous research in relationship marketing that has examined 
investments-related factors as antecedents of commitment.  We find that to better manage underperforming 
customer relationships firms need to go beyond current prescriptions. Specifically: 
• Vendors are likely to find it difficult to get out of underperforming customer relationships when they are 
jointly involved with the customer in co-development activities.  It might be useful for managers to seek 
an unbiased view of a customer relationship before making further commitments.   
• Managers who have difficulty connecting investments they make with relationship performance are more 
likely to persist in underperforming relationships.  Questioning the efficacy of investments before they 
are made might reduce the chances of committing one’s firm to a losing cause. 
 
The differential impact of several of the control variables in our model provides a richer 
understanding of relationship management practices. 
• The “competitive grandstanding” argument of holding onto a customer account in the presence of 
competition, it appears, seems to be used only when things are not going well.  Alternatively, it might be 
that this approach leads to underperformance over time. 
• A lack of attractive alternatives leads firms to persist in underperforming relationships.  Firms might 
benefit from increasing managers’ awareness of the benefits of idling resources as an option.   
• The importance of trust in determining commitment across both sub-samples underscores the importance 
accorded it by research in relationship management.  The fact that the other party can be trusted is 
powerful enough to increase a vendor firms’ commitment irrespective of a relationships’ performance.      
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Finally, the results of our exploratory conjoint study provide a number of guidelines on actions that 
managers’ perceive as effective in turning around underperforming customer relationships.   
• Reframing an underperforming customer relationship’s goals and objectives is the most effective 
method of turning it around.   This is consistent with our field investigations that found variance in 
goals across the dyad to be one of the main reasons for a stalemate in such relationships.   
• Reviewing internal process using cross-functional teams and improving communications and 
information exchange across the dyad are avenues to improved relationship performance.  A 
combination of introspection and communication can prevent recurrences of performance problems.   
• Although customer-level performance measurement systems are important for vendors to work on, 
fixing the system is not perceived by managers as the place to begin to turnaround an individual 
underperforming relationship.    
• The most common methods employed to turn around underperforming customer relationships, 
changing the account management team and redesign of performance management systems from 
volume-based to profitability-based, are not necessarily the best methods.    
 
Limitations and Directions for Future Research 
Our results are subject to limitations.  First, our analysis is focused on industrial markets.  Given 
growing interest by consumer goods manufacturers in managing individual customers, future research might 
examine vendor persistence in underperforming relationships in these contexts.  Second, we use cross-
sectional data.  Given that the relationship phenomenon is temporal in nature, future research needs to take a 
longitudinal approach to our research question.  It would also be fruitful for future research to take a dyadic 
view.  Our field survey data is focused specifically on the vendor’s perspective.  It should also be noted that 
there is a potential for common method bias in our study.  We believe that this effect is minimal and does not 
affect our directional prescriptions.  Future research will also need to validate the new scales developed for 
this study.  Our focus was on studying the main effects of the various factors on relationship commitment.  
Interaction effects among the variables included in our study also warrant study.  For example, benefits of 
co-development can be overstated in the absence of performance measurement systems to justify 
commitment.  Studying these variables together could help delineate boundaries for co-development in 
commitment models.  Also, from a relationship stage theory perspective (Jap and Ganesan 2000), the effects 
observed in this study might vary with relationship stage. 
 Alternatively, our research question might be viewed as a special case of learning. Firm’s retention 
of existing customers even when they are underperforming might be viewed as similar to exploitative (i.e., 
use and development of things already known) versus explorative (i.e., the pursuit of new knowledge) 
learning (Levinthal and March 1993).  In fact, the likely return from current customers being generally more 
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certain than returns from new customers, firms might perceive less risk in trying to reinvigorate 
underperforming current customers than in seeking new customers or idling resources. In other words, 
current customer competence becomes a “core rigidity,” that prevents learning from new customer 
opportunities. Future research should investigate this issue.
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Table 1 
Correlations for Underperforming Customer Relationship Sample 
 
Variables Mean S.D 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 
1.  Customer 
reputation 
4.49 1.27 1.00                       
2.  Continuity of 
Personnel 
3.67 1.58 0.11 1.00                      
3.  Relationship 
Age 
9.89 9.21 0.09 -0.00 1.00                     
4.  Relationship 
Importance 
13.49 16.66 0.24 0.02 0.01 1.00                    
5.  Ease of  
Measurement 
3.73 1.21 0.15 0.06 -0.04 0.06 1.00                   
6.  Performance 
Stability 
3.89 1.13 -0.19 -0.10 0.10 0.04 -0.08 1.00                  
7.  Nature of 
Performance 
Change 
4.67 1.23 0.15 0.01 0.09 0.20 0.05 -0.05 1.00                 
8.  Visibility of 
Relationship 
4.84 1.33 -0.40 -0.08 -0.04 -0.09 -0.02 0.17 -0.06 1.00                
9.  Involvement Of 
Senior 
Management 
0.84 0.36 0.20 -0.09 0.12 0.05 -0.04 -0.14 0.09 -0.25 1.00               
10. Customer 
Orientation 
5.23 1.14 0.30 0.09 0.09 0.07 0.01 -0.13 -0.09 -0.26 0.06 1.00              
11. Risk Taking 3.35 1.12 -0.14 0.11 -0.01 -0.15 -0.32 -0.02 -0.16 -0.10 0.01 0.21 1.00             
12.  Co-
development 
3.93 1.29 0.25 0.26 -0.11 0.08 0.23 -0.13 0.07 -0.17 0.04 0.22 -0.07 1.00            
13.  Efficacious 
investment 
4.47 1.14 0.34 0.06 0.04 0.04 -0.03 -0.08 -0.01 -0.13 0.04 0.25 -0.03 0.20 1.00           
14. Asset 
specificity 
4.32 1.14 0.47 0.11 0.05 0.27 0.08 -0.07 0.21 -0.34 0.31 0.23 -0.11 0.42 0.29 1.00          
15.  Resource 
commitment 
5.04 1.06 0.64 0.14 -0.01 0.30 0.09 -0.17 0.07 -0.44 0.19 0.22 -0.05 0.35 0.35 0.59 1.00         
16. Competitive 
Intensity 
5.54 1.66 0.33 -0.02 0.06 0.03 0.05 -0.03 0.01 -0.06 0.04 0.27 -0.01 0.06 0.22 0.12 0.21 1.00        
17. Environmental 
Turbulence 
4.17 1.1 0.07 -0.03 -0.08 0.23 -0.00 0.01 0.06 0.03 0.10 -0.02 -0.12 0.02 0.06 0.10 0.15 0.15 1.00       
18. Trust 4.10 1.32 0.26 0.36 -0.06 0.06 -0.14 -0.14 -0.02 -0.12 0.03 0.31 0.33 0.16 0.13 0.11 0.22 0.13 -0.04 1.00      
19. Relationship 
Conflict 
4.58 1.36 -0.16 -0.17 -0.05 0.01 0.08 0.10 0.25 -0.06 0.12 -0.20 -0.16 0.05 0.09 0.18 -0.05 -0.18 -0.01 -0.52 1.00     
20. Comparison 
Level of 
Alternatives 
4.29 1.28 0.56 0.13 0.06 0.26 -0.03 -0.16 -0.00 -0.22 0.14 0.30 0.06 0.11 0.19 0.21 0.42 0.37 0.10 0.49 -0.33 1.00    
21. Relationship 
Stage 
3.08 0.75 -0.12 -0.01 0.03 0.04 0.11 0.02 0.21 0.06 0.11 -0.07 -0.09 -0.10 -0.09 -0.00 -0.06 -0.04 0.09 -0.01 0.07 -0.04 1.00   
22. Affective 
Commitment 
3.86 1.44 0.36 0.28 0.07 0.19 0.05 -0.19 -0.11 -0.08 -0.01 0.43 0.15 0.14 0.14 0.09 0.29 0.34 0.02 0.57 -0.48 0.51 -0.10 1.00  
23. Relationship 
Commitment 
4.87 1.00 0.44 0.23 0.10 0.16 0.07 -0.24 -0.13 -0.16 0.16 0.47 0.03 0.30 0.39 0.27 0.47 0.42 0.03 0.44 -0.25 0.57 -0.06 0.56 1.00 
Note:   italicized correlations are significant at p<0.05 
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Table 2 
Regression Results for Underperforming Customer Relationships 
 
Independent Variables Expected 
Direction of 
Relationship 
Hypothesis 
# 
Standardized 
Regression 
Coefficients 
Dependent Variable  Commitment to 
Stay in 
Relationship 
Relationship-related factors    
Customer account reputation + H1 -0.08 
Continuity of personnel + H2 0.08** 
Relationship age + H3 0.07* 
Relationship importance + H4 0.03 
Performance-related factors    
Ease of measurement - H5 0.03 
Performance stability  - H6 -0.10** 
Nature of performance change - H7 -0.12** 
Organization-related factors    
Visibility of relationship + H8 0.11** 
Senior management involvement +/- H9 0.11** 
Customer retention orientation + H10 0.18** 
Risk taking orientation -  H11 -0.07* 
Investments-related factors    
Co-development + H12 0.09** 
Efficaciousness   + H13 0.17** 
Asset specificity + H14 -0.07 
Resource commitment + H15 0.23** 
Controls    
Competitive intensity +  0.17** 
Environmental uncertainty +/-  -0.07* 
Trust +  0.11** 
Conflict -  0.04 
Comparison level of alternatives (CALT) +  0.24** 
Relationship stage -  0.01 
Affective Commitment +  0.14** 
Overall Model     
N   214 
F (p-value)   14.74 (0.0001) 
R2 (R2 adj )   0.63 (0.59) 
** Significant at 0.05 (one-tailed test).   
*  Significant at 0.10 (one-tailed test). 
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Table 3 
 Comparing the Variables of Interest Across the Two Sub-samples 
 
Variables Mean for the 
Underperforming 
Relationship Sub-
sample 
N=214 
Mean for the 
Above-average 
Performing 
Relationship Sub-
sample 
N=168 
Vendor’s commitment to stay in the 
relationship 
4.858 5.357 
Customer share of vendor’s total profits (%) 7.79 18.46 
Ratio of customer share of profit/customer 
share of revenue ** 
0.60 1.42 
Relationship age (in years) 
(range in years) 
9.837 
(1 to 71) 
11.301 
(1 to 62) 
Account reputation 4.479 5.103 
Continuity of personnel 3.708 4.079 
Relationship importance 13.22 18.46 
Performance stability* 3.893 4.032 
Nature of performance change*  4.676 4.418 
Ease of performance measurement 3.720 3.757 
Visibility of relationship 4.850 5.106 
Senior management involvement 
 Yes 
 No 
 
34 
182 
 
29 
139 
Customer retention orientation 5.237 5.458 
Risk taking orientation 3.331 3.237 
Co-development 3.927 4.047 
Efficaciousness 4.565 4.759 
Asset specificity 4.317 4.542 
Resource commitment 5.033 5.474 
Environmental uncertainty 4.17 4.17 
Competitive intensity 5.518 5.909 
Trust 4.087 4.532 
Conflict 4.593 4.22 
Comparison level of alternatives (CALT)*** 4.275 5.048 
Affective commitment 3.84 4.48 
Relationship stage 
 Exploration 
 Build up 
 Maturity 
 Decline 
 
13 
19 
135 
49 
 
11 
8 
124 
25 
** - Values reported are the average of the ratio of customer share of profit/customer share of revenue for each 
observation. 
*   - Items were worded differently in the above-average performance sub-sample. 
Note:  We checked for the difference in means across the two sub-samples. The overall omnibus F-test was 
significant (α=0.05).  The pairwise Tukey’s tests are significantly different (α=0.05) for numbers in bold.  
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Table 4   
Regression Results for Above Average Performance Customer Relationships 
 
Independent Variables Expected 
Direction of 
Relationship 
Hypothesis 
# 
Standardized 
Regression 
Coefficients 
Dependent Variable  Commitment to 
Stay in 
Relationship 
Relationship-related factors    
Customer account reputation + H1 0.14** 
Continuity of personnel + H2 0.04 
Relationship age + H3 0.15** 
Relationship importance + H4 0.08 
Performance-related factors    
Ease of measurement - H5 0.03 
Performance stability   - H6 0.04 
Nature of performance change - H7 -0.01 
Organization-related factors    
Visibility of relationship + H8 -0.04 
Senior management involvement +/- H9 0.06 
Customer retention orientation + H10 0.19** 
Risk taking orientation -  H11 0.02 
Investments-related factors    
Co-development + H12 0.06 
Efficaciousness   + H13 0.09* 
Asset specificity + H14 0.12** 
Resource commitment + H15 0.25** 
Controls    
Competitive intensity +  0.02 
Environmental uncertainty +/-  -0.08* 
Trust +  0.22** 
Conflict -  0.05 
Comparison level of alternatives (CALT) +  -0.01 
Relationship stage -  -0.06 
Affective Commitment +  0.23** 
Overall Model     
N   168 
F (p-value)   11.09 (0.0001) 
R2 (R2 adj )   0.63 (0.57) 
 
** Significant at 0.05 (one-tailed test).   
*  Significant at 0.10 (one-tailed test). 
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Table 5 
 Description of Attributes Used in the Conjoint Survey 
Based on the results of our qualitative interviews, we developed the following seven common factors 
as the basis for the conjoint scenarios (the levels used in the conjoint analysis are included in parentheses). 
 
1. Internal processes 
• The ease with which the vendor can put together a cross-functional team to evaluate and change 
internal processes used in the dealing with the customer (Easy/Difficult) 
 
2. Continuity of account personnel 
• The account management personnel who will manage the relationship into the future 
(Current/New) 
 
3. Strategic fit 
• The ease with which the vendor firm can justify the customer’s strategic fit with the vendor’s 
product-market strategy (Easy/Difficult). 
 
4. Compensation systems 
• The ease with which the vendor firm can set up compensation systems for account management 
personnel that focus on profitability rather than volume (Easy/Difficult) 
 
5. Performance measurement systems 
• The ease with which the vendor firm can set up measurement systems to better capture the 
performance of both vendor and customer (Easy/Difficult) 
 
6. Communications and information exchange 
• The ease with which the vendor firm can enhance communications and information sharing 
targeted at developing a deeper understanding of customer needs (Easy/Difficult) 
 
7. Realistic joint goals and objectives 
• The ease with which the vendor firm can work with the customer to reframe and set realistic 
goals and objectives (Easy/Difficult) 
 
 
 
Formatted: Bullets and Numbering
Formatted: Bullets and Numbering
Formatted: Bullets and Numbering
Formatted: Bullets and Numbering
Formatted: Bullets and Numbering
Formatted: Bullets and Numbering
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Table 6 
  Conjoint Analysis Regression Results 
 
Factors Unstandardized 
Coefficient 
Standardized 
Coefficient 
t-value Conjoint 
Importance 
Weights 
 
Reframe realistic joint 
goals and objectives 
 
1.00 0.22 4.93 0.20 
Improve 
communications and 
information exchange 
 
0.88 0.19 4.00 0.17 
Evaluate and change 
internal processes 
 
0.85 0.18 4.47 0.17 
Develop improved 
performance 
measurement systems 
 
0.68 0.15 3.76 0.14 
Change compensation 
systems to focus on 
profitability 
 
0.64 0.14 3.51 0.13 
Justify customer’s 
strategic fit 
 
0.58 0.12 2.77 0.11 
Continuity of 
relationship personnel 
 
0.45 0.09 1.96 0.083 
R2adjusted 
 
0.20    
F-value (p-level) 20.84 (0.0001)    
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 Figure 1: A Conceptual Model of a Vendor’s Commitment to Stay in an Underperforming Customer Relationship 
Relationship-related factors
• Customer account reputation
• Continuity of personnel
• Relationship age
• Relationship importance
Performance-related factors
• Ease of measurement
• Performance stability
• Nature of performance change
Organization-related factors
• Visibility of relationship
• Senior management involvement
• Customer retention orientation
• Risk taking orientation
Investments-related factors
• Co-development
• Efficaciousness
• Asset specificity
• Resource commitment
Vendor’s commitment to stay 
in an underperforming 
customer relationship
Controls
• Competitive Intensity
• Environmental uncertainty
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• Conflict
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• Affective commitment
 
 Appendix 
 Measures Used in the Study 
Commitment to stay in the relationship (Adapted from Anderson and Weitz 1989; Noordewier, John and Nevin 1990; 
α=0.92) 
• Maintaining a long-term relationship with this customer is important to us. 
• We expect to persist in this relationship. 
• We are committed to continue in this relationship. 
• This relationship will survive for a long time. 
• This relationship will be a permanent fixture in our customer portfolio. 
• Renewal of any contracts/agreements in this relationship is virtually automatic. 
• We will abandon this customer relationship in the near future.* 
 
RELATIONSHIP-RELATED FACTORS 
Account reputation  (Developed for this study; α=0.85) 
• The relationship gives us prestige within the industry. 
• The relationship gives us a feeling of accomplishment. 
• This is a “showcase” relationship. 
• This relationship defines us. 
• Overall, this relationship is critical for us. 
Continuity of personnel (Developed for this study; α=0.72) 
• There has been stability in personnel across the two sides in this relationship. 
• The personnel in this relationship have dealt with each other for a long time. 
• There has been little turnover in the contact personnel involved in this relationship. 
Relationship age (From Kumar, Scheer and Steenkamp 1995) 
• For how long has your firm had a relationship with this customer?  ____ years 
Relationship importance (Bharadwaj, Challagalla and Sheth 1998) 
• The sales to this customer (as a percentage of our total sales) is: ___________ 
 
PERFORMANCE-RELATED FACTORS 
Nature of performance change (Developed for this study; α=0.71) 
• It has taken a long time for this relationship to deteriorate. 
• The deterioration in this relationship has been slow and extended over time.  
• There have been defining moments that have negatively affected this relationship.* 
• It is easy to isolate events that have led to the current state of this relationship.* 
Performance stability (Developed for this study; α=0.68) 
• We do not expect the current performance state of the relationship to last long.  
• Given the relationship history, the current performance is a temporary. 
• We expect the relationship performance to change in the near future. 
• We believe that the current performance shortfall is a temporary. 
Ease of measurement (Developed for this study; α=0.82) 
• Our current performance metrics do not provide a complete picture of the costs and benefits of this relationship. 
• It is difficult to quantify our costs to serve this customer.  
• Our systems do not capture our efforts to serve this customer.  
• It is difficult for us to isolate the profit in this customer relationship. 
 
ORGANIZATION-RELATED FACTORS 
Visibility of relationship (Developed for this study) 
• Any actions taken in managing this relationship are visible to others in the firm.   
• This relationship is high profile, visible, and transparent within our firm. 
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Senior management involvement (Developed for this study) 
• Is the top management team involved in this customer relationship? (Answer “Yes” or “No”) 
Customer retention orientation (Developed for this study; α=0.71) 
• Focusing on customer retention is a central tenet of our organization.  
• Our management expects us to do anything required to retain our customers.   
• Customer retention is a key component of our strategic intent.   
Risk taking orientation (Adapted from Jaworski and Kohli 1993; α=0.85) 
• Advocates of failed customer relationships become scapegoats in our firm. 
• Advocates of innovative customer relationships carry the entire burden of possible failure.  
• In my firm it is understood that failure is a necessary part of success.* 
• Our management does not understand that when you try something new, you sometimes fail. 
• In our firm failure is accepted as a likely by-product of taking a lot of initiatives.* 
• Finger pointing happens all the time in our firm. 
• In our firm a mistake is seen as an opportunity to learn.* 
• The executives involved in this relationship are not willing to admit to mistakes. 
• The executives managing this relationship are concerned about their job security.  
 
INVESTMENT-RELATED FACTORS 
Co-development (Bharadwaj, Challagalla, and Sheth 1998; α=0.84) 
This customer… 
• is willing to try new products we develop.  
• is open to new product ideas.   
• is involved in co-development of our product.  
• provides us input for new product development. 
• is willing to beta test our products.  
Efficaciousness (Formative scale developed for this study) 
• We view our resource commitments in this relationship as likely to significantly change relationship performance. 
• The investments we make in this relationship will affect its performance significantly.  
• We have made a number of investments aimed at relationship performance improvements. 
• Our commitments in this relationship are likely to enhance relationship performance.  
Asset Specificity (Adapted from Anderson and Weitz 1992; Heide and John 1992; α=0.77) 
• We have made significant investments in training salespeople, tooling, equipment and so forth dedicated to our 
relationship with this customer. 
• If we lost this customer we would lose a lot our investments in this relationship. 
• We have invested substantially in personnel dedicated to this customer. 
• We have gone out of our way to link us with this customer’s business. 
• Our systems (e.g., production, accounting, logistics) have been tailored to serve this customer. 
• Gearing up to deal with this customer requires highly specialized investments (e.g., tools, equipment etc.). 
• This customer has some unusual needs that required adaptation on our part. 
Resource commitment (Menon et al. 1999; α=0.62) 
• Compared to our other customer relationships we have invested significantly greater resources in this relationship. 
• Our relationship investment with this customer is very important to the achievement of our organizational goals. 
• We view our resource commitment in this relationship as an investment.  
• We view our resource commitment in this relationship as necessary expenditures for keeping the relationship 
operational 
 
CONTROLS 
Competitive intensity (Developed for this study; α=0.88) 
• There are other vendors that are keen to take over our share of this customer’s business. 
• Competition for this customer’s business is intense. 
• Other vendors are always seeking to take away our business with this customer. 
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Environmental uncertainty (Formative scale adapted from Bharadwaj, Challagalla, and Sheth 1998)  
How would you describe the market environment of your firm? 
• Easy to monitor trends—Difficult to monitor trends 
• Stable industry volume—Volatile industry volume 
• Sales forecasts are accurate—Sales forecasts are quite inaccurate 
• Predictable market environment—Unpredictable market environment 
• Customer product preferences are stable—Customer’s product preferences change a lot 
• Competitive moves are infrequent—Competitive moves occur almost every day 
Conflict (Developed for this study; α=0.80) 
• To accomplish their objectives sometimes this customer manipulates information. 
• To accomplish their objectives sometimes this customer does not keep promise. 
• It is common for us to have a difference in opinions with this customer. 
• Overall, our relationship with this customer can be viewed as adversarial.   
Comparison level of alternatives  (From Anderson and Narus 1990; α=0.80)     
How attractive is this customer compared to others in terms of (anchored on Much more …Much less)      
• Generating sales?  
• Generating profit?   
• Cooperating with your firm?  
• Making payments? 
• Providing endorsements (i.e., word-of-mouth)? 
Relationship Stage (From Jap and Ganesan 2000) 
Relationships typically evolve through a number of phases over time. Which of the following best describes your firm’s 
current relationship with the customer (check only one)? 
• Exploration: Both firms are discovering and testing the goal compatibility, integrity and performance of the other as 
well as potential obligations, benefits, and burdens involved with working together on a long-term basis. 
• Build up: Both firms are receiving increasing benefits from the relationship and a level of trust and satisfaction has 
been developed such that they are more willing to become committed to the relationship on a long-term basis. 
• Maturity: Both firms have an ongoing, long-term relationship in which both are receiving acceptable levels of 
satisfaction and benefits. 
• Decline: One or both members have begun to experience dissatisfaction and are contemplating relationship 
termination, considering alternative customers or vendors, and beginning to communicate intent to end the 
relationship. 
• Deterioration: The firms have begun to negotiate terms for ending the relationship and/or are currently in the 
process of dissolving the relationship. 
Trust (Adapted from Ganesan 1994; α=0.84) 
• Our promises to each other are reliable. 
• We are very honest in dealing with each other. 
• We trust each other. 
• We would go out of our way to help each other out. 
• We consider each other’s interests when problems arise. 
• We feel that we can trust this customer’s organization. 
Affective commitment (Adapted from Kumar, Scheer and Steenkamp 1995; α=0.81) 
• Even if we could we would not drop this customer because we like being associated with them. 
• We want to serve this customer because we genuinely enjoy our relationship with them. 
• Our positive feelings towards the customer are a major reason we continue to work with them. 
 
 
*These items were reverse-coded prior to analyses:   
Unless otherwise stated all scales were measured on a 7 point scale where 7=strongly agree and 1=strongly disagree.  
